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Abstract
Unique benefits can be gained by combining advantages of both micro- and
macrocognitive methods that would otherwise be impossible to gather from either of
these methods separately. The proposed research examines several cognitive functions
within one systematic study that combines some empirical investigation with post-hoc
qualitative assessment to gather knowledge of strategies and computations. Thereby,
analyzing a larger cognitive system in a standardized way. By analyzing several cognitive
functions the multifunction mental model hypothesis (MMM) is explored. This
hypothesis states that performance of one sensemaking operation is predictive of
performance of other related sensemaking operations. Three additional hypotheses were
also explored. (2) Through brief instruction and feedback, mental models are developed
that involve understanding the relational structure between inter-correlated and
independent feature(s). (3) Understanding of the relational structure of the features can be
used to make error correction decisions. (4) The strategies that utilize the inter-correlated
nature of the features can be recognized and verbalized by users. Four Experiments used
a multi-cue probabilistic weather forecasting task. Evidence from Experiments 1-4
supported the MMM hypothesis. Systematic variability in probability estimation by using
differentially weighted features and inter-correlated features were related to evacuation
decisions, error detection, and error correction. Results also supported hypotheses 2-4.
The present research provides evidence which supports the integration of micro- and
macrocognitive methods for a richer understanding of cognitive function in complex
sociotechnical systems.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Research on complex cognitive function has involved a tension between
understanding cognitive function in naturalistic contexts and using laboratory methods to
replicate and isolate that cognitive function for careful study (Gozli, 2017; Kingstone,
Smilek, & Eastwood, 2008; McDermott, 2011; Newell, 1973). Experimental
psychologists often use laboratory methods to often deal with micro- aspects of cognition
in attention, decisions, memory, problem-solving, prediction, and judgments (Cacciabue
& Hollnagel, 1995; Ebbinghaus, 1913; Fitts, 1946; Shipley, 1961). Analyzing micro
aspects of cognition is valuable and necessary, but not sufficient. Frequently, methods
used in the microcognitive paradigm analyze one or two cognitive functions often in the
form of simple linear causal chains (Klein & Hoffman, 2008). Using this reductionist
approach is valuable for gaining large amounts of information about micro aspects of
cognition (Klein et al., 2003). However, while the microcognitive paradigm provides
valuable information about isolated aspects, it may come at the cost of discovering
emergent processes and abilities when analyzed together in context (Gozli, 2017).
Today, this tension characterizes research on cognitive function. At one end,
applied

researchers

(including

clinical

psychologists,

education

research,

Industrial/Organizational research, and Human Factors, and related fields) often focus on
macro-level processes that emerge from the combination of many low-level processes. In
particular, cognitive systems engineering uses naturalistic studies to analyze how
subcomponents fit together in context (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006; Klein &
Hoffman, 2008). However, some have argued that naturalistic approaches can lose the
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assurance of well-designed highly controlled experiments; namely, the ability to draw
causal inferences (Kingstone et al., 2008; McDermott, 2011). They are also less equipped
to establish the same level of fidelity achieved in laboratory settings. In this thesis, I
argue that unique benefits can be gained by combining parts of both methods, resulting in
advantages that would otherwise be impossible to gather from implementing either of
these methods independently. This approach examines several cognitive functions within
one systematic study that combines some empirical investigation with post-hoc
qualitative assessment to gather knowledge of strategies and computations. Thereby,
analyzing a larger cognitive system in a standardized way.
One integrative perspective for understanding higher-level cognition in context
has been called sensemaking. Sensemaking has been defined as internal and external
function performed for the purpose of forming a deeper understanding, so that one can
act effectively. The sensemaking process is accomplished, in part, through the supporting
process that is ‘mental models’ (Kaste, 2012; Klein & Hoffman, 2008; Klein, Moon, &
Hoffman, 2006b) 1. Sensemaking is responsible for a number of operations such as how
people comprehend, explain, make inferences, detect anomalies, diagnose errors, make
predictions, and learn (Klein & Hoffman, 2008; Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006a;
Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Evaluating the role

1

The concept of the ‘mental model’ has been distinguished from similar concepts such as
a ‘frame’ (Klein, Phillips, Rall, & Peluso, 2007). This will be discussed in further detail
later on.
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mental models play in these sensemaking operations is valuable for making inferences
about how performance of these operations could be improved.
This thesis focuses on evaluating several of these valuable sensemaking
operations. I will report on the results of a series of experiments in which participants
interacted with, and made predictions about, a simulated weather forecasting system. I
hypothesize that a variety of different functions, supported by the process of
sensemaking, in this task will draw on common aspects of a mental model of the
simulated weather forecasting system. In other words, I hypothesize people have different
mental models that range in their quality of the intelligent tool that they represent, in this
case a simulated weather forecasting system, and that different chunks of those mental
models might be valuable for certain relatable tasks. Consequently, I predict that, to the
extent there are systematic individual differences in performance on some components of
the task, those who perform better will also perform better on other operations of
sensemaking. I term this prediction as the Multifunction Mental Model Hypothesis
(MMM).
This is not to say that mental models are not dynamic and cannot change, nor that
a different mental model could not be chosen entirely. In fact evidence suggests mental
models are elaborated and refined (Johnson-Laird, 2005; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992).
However, simply because a mental model of an intelligent tool changes does not mean
that functions used to operate the intelligent tool are not supported by the same parts or
aspects of the mental model. It only implies that a new or refined mental model replaces
the previous mental model.

4
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To explore and test this hypothesis, I will present four experiments which were

designed to evaluate several sensemaking operations, including: learning relations
between variables (i.e. function learning), decision making, forecasting, system error
detection, and system error correction. In contrast to traditional experimental psychology
experiments that have studied these operations in isolation, I will examine how these
operations are supported by a common knowledge base and how they are related.
Analyzing sensemaking operations in weather forecasting is an ideal space for combining
methods of both the micro- and macrocognitive paradigms. A number of micro- and
macrocognitive studies have been conducted in weather forecasting (Gluck & Bower,
1988; Gluck, Shohamy, & Myers, 2002; Hoffman, LaDue, Trafton, Mogil, & Roebber,
2017). However, consistent with the microcognitive paradigm these microcognitive
studies have not evaluated a larger cognitive system, merely micro aspects of that system
such as category learning (Gluck et al., 2002). A number of macrocognitive studies have
also been conducted in more naturalistic contexts (Hoffman et al., 2017). However, these
studies are not able to achieve the same level of fidelity as can be achieved within the lab.
Therefore, there is an opportunity to expand upon previous work.
In addition to the MMM hypothesis, three other hypotheses are also proposed. The
second hypothesis is that through brief instruction and feedback, mental models are
developed that involve understanding the relational structure between inter-correlated and
independent feature(s). The third hypothesis is that understanding of the relational
structure of the features can be used to make error correction decisions. The last
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hypothesis is that the strategies that utilize the inter-correlated nature of the features can
be recognized and verbalized by users.
Exploring error detection, diagnosis, and correction by using inter-correlated
features is valuable. Across many naturalistic contexts—including weather forecasting—
the features used for error detection, diagnosis, and correction are inter-correlated. In
order to help explain error detection and diagnosis by using inter-correlated features I will
provide an illustrative example. An easy way to do that is to demonstrate inter-correlation
as a result of location. Imagine three weather sensors located at Northern Michigan
University (NMU). Now imagine three weather sensors located 100 miles away at
Michigan Technological University (MTU). Whether these sensors were reporting
information on temperature, rain fall, or cloud coverage it is highly likely that the sensors
located at the same university are reporting the same information. For example, all three
sensors will likely all be reporting snowfall or all three sensors will be reporting rain. If
one of the sensors reported sunshine and the other two sensors in the same location
reported rainfall one might think there is an error in the sensor reporting the inconsistent
information. However, if the three sensors at NMU reported sunshine and the three
sensors at MTU reported snowfall you wouldn’t necessarily think that there was an error
with the sensors. This is because the information reported from the sensors in the same
location are inter-correlated while the information reported from the sensors located at
NMU versus the information being reported from MTU are relatively independent. In
order to accurately detect, diagnose, and correct an error by using inter-correlated
features it requires a different kind of strategy and mental computation compared to

6
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diagnosing errors by using independent features alone. Therefore, it is valuable to
determine (1) if operates can learn the relational structure of the inter-correlated features
(2) if that understanding can be utilized for detecting, diagnosing, and correcting errors
and (3) if this strategy can be recognized and verbalized.
In this thesis I argue that studying mental models in the lab utilizes advantages of
both micro- and macrocognitive paradigms. Studying mental models by combining these
methods provides an opportunity to analyze how different sub components of cognition
fit together in a larger system that is sensemaking in a systematic way. The MMM
hypothesis is also explored; those who perform better in one sensemaking operation will
also perform better on other operations of sensemaking. Implications of this hypothesis,
such as training, is also explored.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The outline of this literature review is as follows. First, I briefly review the
definitions of micro- and macrocognition and their distinguishing features. Reviewing the
micro- and macrocognitive paradigms is valuable for demonstrating their strengths and
weaknesses and for arguing why combining methods from each paradigm creates unique
advantages. I then provide a review of the definition of the integrative process under
investigation—sensemaking. This review of what sensemaking is and how the
sensemaking process operates lays the foundation to understand the role mental models
play during the sensemaking process. Finally, the definition of mental model and its role
within error management is discussed. This review is valuable for providing support for
the MMM hypothesis and demonstrating some of its potential implications in an applied
context.
Distinguishing Microcognition from Macrocognition
Microcognition and macrocognition are complementary paradigms of research
(Klein et al., 2003). However, to better understand this it is helpful to examine and define
each perspective more clearly. Microcognition is the study of invariant processes often in
the form of binary oppositions such as: massed vs. distributed practice, serial vs. parallel
processing, exhaustive vs. self-terminating search, single code vs. multiple code, and so
on (Cacciabue & Hollnagel, 1995; Klein et al., 2003; Newell, 1973). The study of
microcognition often utilizes college students in controlled artificial laboratory settings
(Smieszek & Rußwinkel, 2013). One of the advantages of microcognitive study is
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internal validity, or the ability to draw causal inference (McDermott, 2011). Convenient
and large samples are useful when analyzing the effects of several independent variables
on a dependent variable, which requires much larger sample sizes in order to conduct
more complex statistical analyses.
In comparison, macrocognition is the framework for describing cognition as it
naturally occurs (Klein et al., 2003; Schraagen, Klein, & Hoffman, 2008). The study of
macrocognition focuses on the performance of complex human-machine systems as a
whole (Smieszek & Rußwinkel, 2013). To accomplish this goal, researchers often
analyze subject matter experts within naturalistic contexts using cognitive task analysis
methods (Crandall et al., 2006; Klein & Hoffman, 2008; Klein et al., 2003).
Macrocognitive research includes topics such as naturalistic decision making, planning,
problem detection, coordination, adaptation, and sensemaking (Klein, Pliske, Crandall, &
Woods, 2005; Klein et al., 2003). Although many of these topics are also studied from a
microcognitive perspective there are two typical differences. (1) Reliance on studying the
functions in a natural context, and (2) examining how multiple microcognitive functions
interact to produce emergent complex behavior.
Micro- and macrocognition are not antagonist paradigms of research (Smieszek &
Rußwinkel, 2013). Rather, each can be used to inform and inspire the other (Klein et al.,
2003). Some have suggested a bottom up approach; start with microcognitive phenomena
to inspire research in macrocognitive function (Klein et al., 2003). While others have
suggested that by first observing phenomena as it naturally occurs we are more likely to
create universally valid theories (Kingstone et al., 2008). Theories derived from
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phenomena observed in naturalistic contexts will likely be more robust compared to
phenomena only analyzed within the lab. Effects discovered within the lab may be so
sensitive to other variables within more naturalistic contexts that the same effects may
never be observed in those more naturalistic contexts (Kingstone et al., 2008).
As mentioned above, there are two main distinctions between micro- and
macrocognition: analyzing the system as a whole and analyzing the phenomena in
context. The present research focuses on the integrated cognitive system, but does not
focus on cognition in context. Creating naturalistic conditions in the lab is challenging
(Schraagen et al., 2008). However, consistent with the recommendations provided by
Kingstone et al., (2008) the emergent process under investigation, sensemaking, is based
on the expansive research conducted in naturalistic settings (Hoffman et al., 2017; Kaste,
2012). Mental models used by experts in weather forecasting have been observed in
complex naturalistic environments (Hoffman et al., 2017). These mental models are used
for a number of sensemaking operations. However, testing the interactions and relations
of several related sensemaking operations has yet to be explored in the lab. I’m
attempting to analyze a larger cognitive system within the lab. This fills a valuable gap
because the nature of the microcognitive paradigm is fundamentally reductionist. This
reductionist approach misses the opportunity to analyze the fluctuations and interactions
between the primary functions/behavior and their supporting functions (Klein &
Hoffman, 2008). Such as the use of mental models for various related sensemaking
operations.

10
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What is sensemaking?
From military operations, to leadership, to weather forecasting, researchers are
studying the role of sensemaking on vital operations (Alberts & Garstka, 2004; Ancona,
2012; Hoffman et al., 2017). Sensemaking has been studied from diverse disciplinary
backgrounds. There is not one unified definition of sensemaking accepted across
disciplines (Weick, 1995). It is beyond the scope of the present paper to review all
definitions of sensemaking 2. However, since the primary focus of the present paper is on
the role sensemaking plays in complex human-machine systems, it is more valuable to
review what some notable systems engineers’ perspective is on sensemaking.
In their seminal paper, Klein, Moon, and Hoffman (2006a) provide a thorough
investigation as to what is meant when researchers say ‘sensemaking.’ The authors
distinguish their definition from previous definitions such as “how people make sense out
of their experience in the world,” indicating that this type of definition is too broad and
could encompass years of previous research in concepts such as creativity, curiosity,
comprehension, and situation awareness. Rather, the authors define sensemaking as “a
motivated, continuous effort to understand connections (which can be among people,
places, and events) in order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively” (Klein et
al., 2006a, p. 71).

2

See (Dervin & Naumer, 2009) for review on approaches of sensemaking.
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Based on previous experience, when an operator approaches a system they have a
frame (which is related to yet distinct from the concept of mental model). Sensemaking is
required when there is some kind of ambiguity, complexity, or anomaly (without which
there would be nothing to make sense of). Within a socio-technical system this occurs
when feedback from an intelligent tool is inconsistent with the operators’ current frame.
An operator could choose to ignore the anomaly. However, if the operator does not
ignore the anomaly then both mental mechanisms and external behavior may be required
to increase their understanding of the anomaly which can elaborate an existing frame or
choose a new frame entirely. Across the literature of sensemaking, many support the
notion that sensemaking is not limited to only internal mechanisms but rather
sensemaking also consists of behaviors (Dervin, 1983; Pirolli & Russell, 2011; Weick et
al., 2005). This could be in the form of communication. Some have gone as far as to say
sensemaking involves any activity performed for the purpose of “collecting and
organizing information for deeper understanding” (Pirolli & Russell, 2011, p. 1).
Somehow an operator needs to go through a process of reconciling what he/she already
knows about the system (which is in the form of a frame) with the new information that
does not currently fit within their existing understanding (or frame). This is the process of
sensemaking. This processes is depicted in the data/frame model (Klein et al., 2006b).

12
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Mental Models
Without mental models many of the functions of sensemaking would not be
possible (Fallon, Murphy, Zimmerman, & Mueller, 2010; Klein et al., 2006b) 3. Mental
models support vital functions such as reasoning, explaining, and predicting (JohnsonLaird, 2001, 2006; Jones, Ross, Lynam, Perez, & Leitch, 2011; Rouse & Morris, 1986).
Some dispute the existence of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983), however, the
continually growing empirical and theoretical evidence provides strong support for their
existence (Gentner & Stevens, 2014; Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2005; Klein & Hoffman,
2008). Similarly to sensemaking, the definition of ‘mental model’ is controversial
(Moray, 1999; Revell & Stanton, 2012; Richardson & Ball, 2009; Rouse & Morris,
1986).
Before reviewing what mental models are, it is valuable to review what they are
not. Some scholars view mental models as only a store of knowledge. Defining mental
models as collections of knowledge has been considered as whole a class of definitions
for mental models (Schumacher & Czerwinski, 1992). However, I argue that mental
models are not mere collections of knowledge. Specifically, defining mental models in
this way neglects the relational structure of mental models (Craik, 1943). Defining mental
models as only knowledge stores results in a loss of utility by neglecting many of their
functions such as problem solving and prediction (Rouse & Morris, 1986). Both

3

See Rouse and Morris (1986) for a review of the diverse definitions of mental models.
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empirical and theoretical research has suggested mental models are used for these and
other vital functions (Gentner & Stevens, 2014; Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2005; Rouse &
Morris, 1986). Mental models are also distinct from a ‘frame’ (Klein et al., 2006a). A
frame has been defined as “a structure for accounting for the data and guiding the search
for more data.” (Klein et al., 2007, p. 118). In other words, a mental model is similar to
the concept of a frame but a frame has some distinct aspects to it. Such as, taking the
form of a narrative or story (Klein et al., 2007).
The origins of the theory of mental models could lead back all the way to the
work of Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica (1267) (Klein & Hoffman, 2008). However,
according to Johnson-Laird (1983), the history of the theory of mental models really
begins with Kenneth Craik. According to Craik all thinking is a manipulation of internal
representations of the external world (Craik, 1943). Craik laid the groundwork for future
theoretical and empirical research on mental models. Many of the first principles of
mental models identified by Johnson-Laid are attributed to the work of Craik, including:
the principle of iconicity, the principle of possibilities, and the principle of truth. Some
have suggested that these and additional principles are what distinguish mental models
from other types of mental representations such as linguistic structures and semantic
networks (Johnson-Laird, 2005). In order to unpack what mental models are and how
they operate a couple of the Johnson-Lairds’ proposed mental model principles will be
briefly reviewed.
The first principle is the principle of iconicity. This principle simply states that a
“mental model has a structure that corresponds to the known structure of what it
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represents” (Johnson-Laird, 2005, p. 187). The iconic nature of mental models can
include mental imagery in combination with organized knowledge of concepts and
relationships (Forrester, 1971; Klein & Hoffman, 2008). The imagistic nature of mental
models can be used to help explain how a dynamic system operates (Klein & Hoffman,
2008). If an operator’s mental model did not correspond to the dynamic system, the
operator would likely not be able to infer the cause and effect relations between the
different elements of that system.
The second principle is the principle of strategic variation. This principle simply
states that “given a class of problems, reasoners develop a variety of strategies from
exploring manipulations of models” (Johnson-Laird, 2005, p. 191). If we define error
diagnosis in terms of problem solving, then exploring manipulations to mental models is
key to an accurate diagnosis. Variation is valuable for providing insight, learning, and
creativity (Johnson-Laird, 2004). Strategic variation is similar to the elaboration cycle
within the data/frame model (Kaste, 2012; Klein et al., 2006b; Klein et al., 2007). This
principle implies that mental models can be dynamic. There is an interaction between the
nature of the mental model and the task the mental model is supporting.
Mental models are challenging to define (Klein & Hoffman, 2008). Indeed, it is
unclear what the correct definition is of mental models. The concept of a ‘mental model’
has been defined in a plurality of ways and is similar yet distinct from a number of other
related concepts such as a frame. However, the principles listed above help distinguish
mental models from other types of mental representations. It is unclear whether or not the
principles above will ever be able to be truly falsifiable. However, these principles are
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congruent with other definitions used by cognitive engineers. Particularly, in terms of
mental models being: imagistic, dynamic, and mapping onto something in the world
(Klein & Hoffman, 2008).
The principles also illustrate the usefulness and necessity of mental models for many
vital sensemaking functions such as error detection, diagnoses, and correction in
intelligent tools. Mental models represent the dynamic relationships and interactions
between different elements of an intelligent tool, and are used to understand the causal
relations necessary for error diagnosis (Klein et al., 2007).
To summarize, the definition of mental models are internal representations of the
external world. The structure of the mental model corresponds to the spatial, temporal,
and causal relations of the elements perceived in the external world by using a
combination of mental imagery and organized knowledge of concepts and relations.
Finally, mental models can test hypotheses by running variations of existing mental
models.
Mental models play a role in all macrocognitive functions. Particularly, in the
macrocognitive phenomena sensemaking. Many aspects of error management requires
various sensemaking operations which rest on the use of mental models. Good error
management is vital for the future of effective and enduring intelligent tools. Therefore,
the role of mental models within error management is a valuable place to explore.

16
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Error Management of Intelligent Tools
The focus of the present research is on the role mental models play in complex
human-machine systems. The modern world is becoming increasingly technologically
advanced. Utilizing intelligent tools is frequently cheaper, more accurate, and reliable
compared to human performance alone. However, when intelligent tools are not accurate
and reliable it can be necessary to detect, diagnose, and correct it. This process is known
as error management (McBride, Rogers, & Fisk, 2014). Understanding how people
detect, diagnose, and correct errors is valuable for designers to create more optimized and
adaptive systems. Unfortunately, despite the vital role of error management within
complex human-machine systems, error management is still poorly understood (McBride
et al., 2014). To the extent that operators have an accurate mental model of the intelligent
tool they are operating they are better equipped to detect, diagnosis, and correct errors in
the intelligent tool.
Quality mental models can be useful for error management. However, it should be
noted that a mental model is not the representation of the intelligent tool itself, rather the
internal representation that the user has created of that intelligent tool (Moray, 1999;
Norman, 1983). Therefore, mental models often do not perfectly correspond to what it is
representing. As a result, mental models are often not complete and inaccurate (Norman,
1983) 4. However, through effective training mental models can be elaborated and

4

See Norman (1983) for full discussion of system mental model challenges.
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refined; increasing operator performance in detecting, diagnosing, and correcting errors.
Therefore, analyzing how to effectively train operators to create more accurate mental
models is valuable.
Summary
The vital role mental models play in performance in macrocognitive processes
makes their evaluation necessary. Empirical evidence of mental models has been limited
(Klein & Hoffman, 2008). I attempt to help fill this gap. Specifically, I attempt to gather
evidence for four hypotheses. (1) MMM hypothesis; that performance of one
sensemaking operation is predictive of performance of another sensemaking operation.
(2) Through brief instruction and feedback, mental models are developed that involve
understanding the relational structure between inter-correlated and independent
feature(s). (3) Understanding of the relational structure of the features can be used to
make error correction decisions. (4) The strategies that utilize the inter-correlated nature
of the features can be recognized and verbalized by users.

18
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Chapter 3: Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to gather evidence for the first and second
hypotheses. In order to gather evidence for the second hypothesis, Experiment 1 was
designed to test learning of using independent differentially weighted features to make
weather predictions (in the form of probability estimates). Analyzing accuracy of
probability estimates was used to help infer the quality of participants’ mental models of
the simulated weather forecasting system. In order to gather evidence for the MMM
hypothesis, Experiment 1 was also designed to test the relation between participants’
probability estimates and evacuation decisions.
Methods
Participants. Twenty-four participants were recruited from the Michigan
Technological University student subject pool. Students participated in the study for
course credit.
Materials and Procedure. All experiments were programed and administered
through the Psychology Experiment Building Language (PEBL) (Mueller & Piper, 2014).
Similar to the method used by Casteel (2016), participants were asked to imagine
they were a plant manager during the task. Instructions: “In this task, you are a manager
who is making decisions about whether to evacuate your facility, which is located on the
eastern seaboard. There is a hurricane in the Atlantic, and you will need to decide, based
on National Weather Service (NWS) information, the probability of whether the
hurricane will come, and whether you should evacuate the facility.”
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On each trial participants were given 8 features of differentially weighted
diagnostic information for the likelihood of a hurricane: wind speed above 74mph,
rotating winds over the surface of the sea, rising sea level, relative humidity level of 850
hectopascals, falling pressure, temperature above 80°F, rough choppy sea, and overcast
skies (see Table 1). 5 Each feature, reported by the simulated weather forecasting system,
either increased or decreased the likelihood of a hurricane. Whether features increased or
decreased the probability of a hurricane was indicated with the direction of an arrow (see
Figure 1). For example, if wind was reported, it was either reported as a positive indicator
with an up arrow and “wind speed above 74mph” or as a negative indicator with a down
arrow and “wind speed below 74mph”.
Indicator strength described the influence each feature had on the probability of
the hurricane. For example, a “very good” indicator increased or decreased the
probability of a hurricane much more than a feature with an indicator strength reported as
“poor.”

5

How these features are related to forecasting in more naturalistic settings was not
explained. The features were chosen based only on their face validity for being indicators
of a hurricane. They are not representative of the complex dynamic nature of how
hurricanes form. Weather forecasting in the real world is much more complex. The
present research is limited by not analyzing sensemaking operations in naturalistic
contexts.
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Table 1 Materials used for Experiments: Features and their Weights
Feature
Number
F1
F2
F3
F4
F5
F6
F7
F8

Features of Information

Indicator Strength

Wind speed above 74mph
Rotating winds over the surface
of the sea
Rising sea level
Relative humidity level of 850
Hectopascals
Falling Pressures
Temperature above 80°F
Rough choppy sea
Overcast Skies

Very good
Very good
Good
Fair
Fair
Poor
Very poor
Not an indicator at all

Figure 1: Example of typical message shown to participants on each trial.
Participants started with 10 practice trials. A 90(83) taguchi factorial design was
used, meaning participants completed ninety trials with eight features that had three
levels (positive, negative, absent) per feature. Using a taguchi design ensured that there
was a unique feature set on each trial and that every possible combination of features was
shown at least once.
Based on information provided by the weighted features, participants rated the
likelihood of a hurricane from 0% to 100% on a thermometer in the upper right corner of
their screen (see Figure 2). After estimating the probability of a hurricane, participants
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indicated whether they should evacuate or stay. They were told they should evacuate if
there was a high probability of a hurricane, however, that if a hurricane does not hit it
would unnecessarily cost the company money and job performance would suffer.

Figure 2: Likelihood assessment scale for the probability of a hurricane.
After participants made their two judgments (probability estimate and evacuation
decision), both verbal and audio feedback was provided. A box was shown with a 15%
range around the true estimate for the probability of a hurricane based on the weights of
the features shown (see Table 2 for statistical model indicator strength) 6. A beep would
also sound if participants were within the range estimate. If correct, participants were

6

The statistical model used is a simple linear model and is not representative of the realworld dynamic nature of weather. Models used in weather forecasting in more
naturalistic settings are dynamic and therefore much more complex.
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given a score of 100 points. After participants reviewed the feedback, they clicked either
a “Good estimate. Click to continue” button or “Try to improve. Click to continue”
button. The timing of each trial, which features were present, participants probability
estimate of the likelihood of a hurricane, the model probability estimate of a hurricane
(i.e. the true probability estimate), and participants evacuation decisions were recorded.
Table 2: Feature weight values used for statistical model.
Feature Number

Statistical model
Indicator Strength

F1

.8

F2

.8

F3

.6

F4

.5

F5

.5

F6

.2

F7

.1

F8

.01

Results & Discussion
In order to help ensure data quality, each participants’ accuracy was compared to
what would be achieved only by chance. Accuracy was calculated by the number of times
participants made probability estimates within the 15% band of the hidden statistical
model probability estimate. No participant scored at or lower than chance. Accuracy
ranged between 23% - 55% (M = .25, SD = .43), suggesting participants took the
Experiment seriously and did not simply click through.
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The features that were utilized by participants were analyzed. To reduce bias from
non-linear data, a logodds transformation was conducted on participants’ probability
estimates. A multiple linear regression was performed to predict participants’ probability
estimates based on each of the features. Each feature was treated as an independent
variable within the model. Results are shown in Table 3. Table 2 shows the weights of
each feature for the hidden model probability estimate of a hurricane. Results suggest that
almost all of the features significantly predict participants’ probability estimates.
Participants are likely not, therefore, utilizing the take the best heuristic (Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 1996). Indeed, of the eight differentially weighted features the only feature not
a statistically significant predictor of participants’ responses was the feature that
participants were told was not an indicator (i.e. the only irrelevant feature). Consistent
with hypothesis 2 this suggests participants created a mental model that contained the
relational structure of all eight features when making probability estimates.
Table 3. Experiment 1 multiple linear regression
Variable

B

SE B

t

p

F1

.70

.03

23.78

<.01

F2

.56

.03

18.82

<.01

F3

.33

.03

11.31

<.01

F4

.27

.03

9.24

<.01

F5

.21

.03

7.05

.01

F6

.15

.03

4.99

<.01

F7

.07

.03

2.37

.02

F8

-.04

.03

-1.29

.20
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In order to evaluate the relations of evacuation decision and probability estimates,

a correlation was calculated, r =.81, N = 24, p <.01. The evacuation decision was
aggregated according to the average evacuation decision for all participants on each trial.
Consistent with hypothesis 1, results suggest that participants’ evacuation decisions were
closely related to their probability estimates. In other words if participants indicated a
high probability of a hurricane they were more likely to make the decision to evacuate.
In summary, Experiment 1 suggested through brief instruction, visual feedback,
and audio feedback that participants created a mental model of the system which related
all eight differentially weighted features to the probability estimates consistent with the
second hypothesis. This result provides some support for hypothesis 2. The strong
correlation between participants’ probability estimates and evacuation decisions suggests
that the same knowledge (or mental model) used to make the probability estimates was
also used make the evacuation decisions consistent with the MMM hypothesis. The result
suggests participants are basing their evacuation decisions on their estimations by
weighing a number of differentially weighted features into a probability estimate which
suggests on a linear scale whether a hurricane is coming or not. However, how would an
inaccurate and unreliable weather forecasting system influence participants’ mental
models? In more naturalistic settings of weather forecasting systems are not always
entirely accurate (Berger, 2017). One notable example is when the Global Forecasting
System (GFS) inaccurately predicted hurricane Sandys’ day of landfall. An important
aspect of error management is determining where an error could come from. Is the error a
human error or a technological error? Accurately answering this question likely
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influences how a user decides when to use or not use a system. Therefore, it is valuable to
analyze error detection and error correction sensemaking operations.

Chapter 4: Experiment 2
Experiment 1 suggested that through feedback, participants learned to weigh
independent and differentially weighted features to make probability estimates consistent
with hypothesis 2. Some evidence was also gathered for the MMM hypothesis;
evacuation decisions were closely related to probability estimates. Experiment 2 was
designed to extend testing for other vital sensemaking operations. There were two vital
operations experiment 2 was designed to gather data for. (1) Experiment 2 was designed
to test for participants’ ability to make a judgements about the source of an error (either
themselves or the simulated forecasting system). (2) Experiment 2 was designed to test
for participants’ ability to correct an error in the feature report of the simulated weather
forecasting system.
Methods
Participants. Data from seventeen participants were collected from Michigan
Technological University student subject pool (N = 17). Students participated in the study
for course credit.
Materials and Procedure. Materials and Procedures were similar to Experiment
1. However, the evacuation decision was removed and participants were told that there
were some malfunctions in the “weather forecasting system’s sensor report”. They were
told that the simulated weather forecasting system may report a false feature (i.e., a
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positively indicated feature is actually a negatively indicated feature). Each trial
presented all eight features. There were ten practice trials and seventy non-practice trials.
Half of the trials were error trials, meaning that inaccurate information was
reported. If participants were accurate on a non-error trial, participants were given a
score of 100 and moved on to the next trial. If participants were inaccurate on a nonerror trial they were shown visual feedback with the 15% red band around the true
estimate. Participants were asked to click either the “I was wrong” or “System
malfunction” button. Regardless of the button they clicked they were told they were in
fact wrong, and instructed to click the “ok” button to start a new trial.
If participants were accurate on an error trial, they were told their estimate was
wrong and shown the visual feedback with the 15% red band around the true estimate.
Participants were asked to click either the “I was wrong” or “System malfunction”
button. Participants were then informed that the “weather forecasting system” had
malfunctioned. Participants were then asked to select where the error had occurred by
choosing which features were incorrect. Participants could choose one or all features but
had to choose at least one feature before clicking the “ok” button, and then move on to
the next trial. The timing of each trial, which features presented, participants probability
estimate, the model probability estimate, blame choice, and which features selected to
correct the system fault were all recorded.
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Results and Discussion
Similar to Experiment 1, accuracy of probability estimates were compared to
accuracy that would be achieved only by chance. No participants scored at or lower than
chance. Accuracy ranged between 19% - 66% (M = .34, SD = .47).
The relations between average accuracy by participant in probability estimates
and blame attribution across three different conditions (system correct human error,
system incorrect human error, and system incorrect human correct) was analyzed. First
the relation between average accuracy by participant and blame attribution on trials when
the system was correct but participants made incorrect probability estimates was analyzed
r = -.03, p > .05 (see Figure 3). This result suggests that there are no differences in blame
attributions on the system correct human error condition based on probability estimate
performance. This suggests that regardless of ability levels (or how good participants’
mental models are) participants on this condition accurately blamed themselves.
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Figure 3: Relationship between average accuracy by participant and likelihood to blame
themselves when the system was correct and participants made an error.
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Figure 4: Relationship between average accuracy by participant and likelihood to blame
themselves when the system was incorrect and participants made an error.
There was a large correlation between average accuracy by participant and blame
attribution on trials when the system was incorrect and participants made an error r = .75, p < .01 (see Figure 4). This result suggests that participants who generally perform
better are less likely to blame themselves. In this condition there is no incorrect blame
attribution, however, the result suggests that participants who have a better mental model
of the system (as suggested by their probability estimate performance) are likely aware
they have a good mental model of the system, compared to participants who have a
poorer mental model.
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Figure 5: Relationship between average accuracy by participant and likelihood to
blame themselves when the system was incorrect and participants made an error.
There was a large correlation between average accuracy by participant and blame
attribution on trials when the system was incorrect and participants were correct in their
probability estimates r = -.70, p < .01 (see Figure 5). Consistent with the previous result,
this result suggests that participants who generally perform better are less likely to blame
themselves. If participants generally perform worse this result suggests that they are
likely aware of it, therefore, tend to blame themselves even when they are correct.
An overall correlation was performed between average accuracy by participant for
detecting where the error occurred (i.e. blame attributions) and average accuracy by
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participant for making probability estimates, which was a strong and statistically
significant relation r = .9, p < .01. This result is consistent with the MMM hypothesis.
Average accuracy for correcting probability estimates by adjusting the direction
of the sensor features ranged between 57% - 100% (M = .83, SD = .48). A correlation
was performed between average accuracy by participant when making the initial
probability estimates and average accuracy by participant for correcting the probability
estimates r = -.68, p < .01. This results is not consistent with the MMM hypothesis.
Some of the results from Experiment 2 were consistent with the MMM
hypothesis. Participants’ accuracy at probability estimation was strongly associated with
participants’ ability to make accurate blame attributions. Results also suggested that
participants who had a better mental model of the system (i.e. were more accurate in their
probability estimates) made blame attributions that suggested they knew they had a good
mental model of the system. While participants who had a poorer mental model of the
system were more likely to blame themselves. However, other results did not support the
MMM hypothesis. This suggests that the mental model created with initial learning
through feedback while making weather predictions may not transfer to all sensemaking
operations tested. Experiment 3 was designed to be a replication study of Experiment 2.
Experiment 3 differed only by providing further error diagnosis feedback.
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Chapter 5: Experiment 3
Consistent with the first hypothesis, Experiment 2 suggested that participants’

accuracy at probability estimation was strongly associated with participants’ ability to
make accurate blame attributions. The goal of Experiment 3 was to replicate results from
Experiment 2. The only difference between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 was
additional feature specific error diagnosis feedback.
Method
Participants. Data from twenty-seven participants were collected from the
Michigan Technological University student subject pool. Students participated in the
study for course credit. One participant’s data were removed for not completing the
experiment.
Materials and Procedure. Materials and Procedures were similar to that of
Experiment 2. However, contrary to Experiment 2 after participants chose which features
were inaccurately reported they were provided with visual feedback if they chose the
correct features. The timing of each trial, which features presented, participants
probability estimate, the model probability estimate, blame choice, and which features
selected to correct the system fault were all recorded.
Results and Discussion
Similar to Experiments 1-2 average accuracy by participant was analyzed. No
participant scored at or lower than chance. Accuracy ranged between 20% - 61% (M =
.34, SD = .48).

MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION

33

Results were very similar to Experiment 2. The relation between average accuracy
by participant and blame attribution on trials when the system was correct but
participants made incorrect probability estimates was analyzed r = .07, p > .05. This
result suggests that there are no differences in blame attributions on the system correct
human error condition. There was a medium sized correlation between average accuracy
by participant and blame attribution on trials when the system was incorrect and
participants made an error r = -.49, p < .01. This result suggests that participants who
generally perform better are less likely to blame themselves. There was a medium sized
correlation between average accuracy by participant and blame attribution on trials when
the system was incorrect and participants were correct in their probability estimates r = .51, p < .01. This result also suggests that participants who generally perform better are
less likely to blame themselves.
A correlation was performed across trials between average accuracy by
participant for detecting where the error occurred and average accuracy by participant for
making probability estimates was statistically significant r = .92, p < .01.
Average accuracy for correcting probability estimates by adjusting the direction
of the sensor features ranged between 48% - 93% (M = .57, SD = .49). A correlation was
performed between average accuracy by participant when making the initial probability
estimates and average accuracy by participant for correcting the probability estimates r =
-.33, n = 27, p > .05. Results are not consistent with the MMM hypothesis.
Results from Experiment 3 largely replicated results from Experiment 2.
Experiments 4a-4b were designed to test for further valuable sensemaking operations.
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Particularly, Experiments 4a-4b were designed to test for learning the relations between
inter-correlated features as depicted in the example from Chapter 1. Research has been
conducted on the use of negatively correlated features in decision making (Fasolo,
McClelland, & Todd, 2007). However, understanding of inter-correlated features for the
use of accomplishing complex goals has been relatively unexplored. Using intercorrelated features to make probability estimates are more closely related to how people
make judgments and predictions across a variety of situations—including weather
forecasting. Accurate use of inter-correlated features to make probability estimates, error
detections, and error corrections requires unique mental arithmetic compared to
independent features alone. Therefore, it is valuable to explore.
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Chapter 6: Experiment 4a
Experiments 4a-4b are extensions of Experiments 1-3. Experiment 1 suggested
that through feedback, participants learned to weigh independent and differentially
weighted features to make weather predications. Some evidence was also gathered for the
MMM hypothesis; evacuation decisions were closely related to probability estimates.
Experiments 2-3 provided evidence that supports the notion that participants recognize
how accurate their mental models are of the simulated weather forecasting system.
Experiment 4a is designed to test whether participants can make probability estimates,
detect errors, and correct errors by using inter-correlated features. Experiment 4a and 4b
differ in two ways. The first difference was in how the hidden statistical model created
the “true” probability estimates. In both Experiment 4a and 4b the first three features are
inter-correlated with a correlation of .9. In Experiment 4a the weights of the first three
features were added together to make the probability estimate. In Experiment 4b the
value that appeared most often of the three inter-correlated feature was weighted and
incorporated into the probability estimate. For example, if two of the three features were
negative indicators and the third was a positive indicator (-1,-1, 1) the mode of the three
features was incorporated into the model (-1). The second way the two Experiments
differed was in Experiment 4b the shown probability estimate was removed from the
screen when the error detection in the sensor report questions were asked.
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Methods
Participants. Data from twenty-six participants were collected from the Michigan
Technological University student subject pool. See Table 4 for basic demographic
information.
Table 4: Demographics for Experiments 4a and 4b
Experiment 4a

Experiment 4b

M = 19.62 SD = 1.63

M = 20.16 SD = 177

range 18-24

range 18-23

54% (N = 14) Male

52% (N = 13) Male

Caucasian

92% (N = 24)

80% (N = 20)

Asian

8% (N = 2)

12% (N = 3)

Black

0% (N = 0)

4%(N = 1)

Hispanic

0% (N = 0)

4%(N = 1)

Age

Gender
Ethnicity

Materials and Procedure. Materials and procedure were similar to Experiments
1-3, with a few notable differences. In this task, simulated data was reported from a
simulated weather forecasting system. In order to gather some ecologically validity,
features utilized in this task were based on features from the actual Global Forecasting
System (GFS) model ((NOAA), 2018). The real GFS is a model which combines data
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from four separate sub-models: atmosphere, ocean, land/soil, and sea/ice. Five features
were chosen from the GFS model: long waves, high waves, rotating winds over the
surface of the sea, soil moisture 40-100 cm below the surface, and 50% cloud cover.
Features were chosen based solely off of their face validity. The first three features were
chosen from the ocean sub model, which would be the inter-correlated features. The
independent feature (soil moisture) was chosen from the land/soil sub model. Finally, the
last independent feature (50% cloud cover) was chosen from the atmospheric sub model.
The first three features were inter-correlated with a correlation of .9. Meaning
during the practice trials the features reported information consistent with each other
approximately 90% of the time. The two independent features had a correlation of less
than .1 with the first three inter-correlated features and with each other.
Participants were given 40 practice trials with visual and audio feedback. Practice
trials did not include error trials. Practice trials were designed for participants to gain a
mental model of how the simulated weather forecasting system operated through
instruction and feedback while making probability estimates by using inter-correlated and
independent differentially weighted features. Participants’ accuracy in making probability
estimates was considered to be an empirical measure of how accurate participants’ mental
models were of the system.
Participants also responded to 96 error detection trials. During the error detection
trials participants did not make probability estimates. In contrast, on each trial
participants were shown a list of both inter-correlated and independent features (see
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Table 5). The first three feature, because they were inter-correlated, were listed as having
very good indicator strength when reported together.
Half of the 96 trials contained an error. An error occurred when one or more
feature(s) were incorrectly reported, or when the simulated system calculation incorrectly
calculated an estimate based on the features displayed, or both the features and the
calculation was incorrect. On each trial participants were asked two questions. “Do you
think there is an error in the sensors above?” “Suppose the sensors are correct, is there an
error in the probability estimate?” Participants were asked to click on the ‘yes’ or ‘no’
buttons on each trial.
Participants were provided with feedback from a hypothetical forecasting system
named after the actual “European Forecasting System” (EFS). The EFS reported if the
simulated system did make an error in the sensor report. After clicking the ‘yes’ or ‘no’
button(s) participants were shown a new page with the features and probability estimates.
Similar to previous experiments, participants were asked to choose any incorrectly
reported features.
If the probability estimates were incorrect participants were asked to provide the
accurate probability estimate. Similar to previous experiments visual feedback was
displayed with a 15% red band around the true statistical model probability estimate.
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Table 5: Materials for the proposed Experiment.
Cues of Information

Indicator Strength

Long waves
High waves

Very Good

Rotating winds over
the surface of the sea
Soil moisture 40-100 Very Good
cm below surface
50% cloud cover

Fair

Immediately after completing the 70 error detection trials some post-hoc
questions were asked (see Appendix A for post-hoc questions). Data from nineteen
participants was gathered to assess their knowledge and computations for sensor error
detection. Results were coded according to their sensitivity to the inter-correlated and
independence of the features. After responding to the post-hoc questions, participants
were asked to explain their thought process while responding to five different trials they
had previously responded to. These examples consisted of both inter-correlated and
independent features in the sensor report, in order to assess sensitivity to the independent
and inter-correlated features.
Results & Discussion
For the practice trials, no participants scored at or lower than chance.
Participants accuracy in their probability estimates made during the practice trials ranged
between 33% - 68% (M = .49, SD = .5).
Based on data collected for empirical analyses alone, it is unclear how previous
knowledge of a hurricane influences responses on these tasks. Therefore, the qualitative
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data was analyzed to determine how previous knowledge of hurricanes and weather
forecasting influenced responses on the tasks. Based on the assessment of the qualitative
data, only three of the twenty three participants reported using their previous knowledge
of hurricanes to make sensor error report decisions. The vast majority reported using
feedback from the weather system to learn how to make correct error detection decisions
and probability estimates.
Half of the ninety-six error trials had an error in the sensor report, as produced by
the “Global Forecasting System.” Accuracy for detecting an error in the sensor report
ranged between 52% - 97% (M = .68, SD = .15). In order to accurately detect an error in
the sensor report participants would need to incorporate the relational structure of the
inter-correlated and independent features. Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants would
incorporate the relational structure of the inter-correlated features. In order to test for
sensitivity to feature correlations, first, a general linear model was conducted to compare
the effect of (IV’s) condition type on (DV) sensor error detection accuracy (See Table 6
for the different condition types). A chi-square analysis of deviance was performed on the
model to test if the conditions explained variability in sensor error detection response
more than chance χ2 = 369.95, df = 4, p < .01. Results suggest that condition type (as
identified by Table 6) does influence sensor error detection responses. Based off of these
results further analyses were conducted. A paired samples t-test was performed to test
whether there was a statistically significant difference in error detection responses
between independent feature inconsistent and inter-correlated feature inconsistent
conditions. There was a significant difference in responses between when the
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independent feature was inconsistent (M = .59, SD = .25) and when the inter-correlated
feature was inconsistent (M = .37, SD = .21); t(25) = 3.15, p < .01. (A higher average
indicates more “no error” responses to sensor error detection question.) Consistent with
hypothesis 2, this result suggests that participants were sensitive to and understood the
relational structure of the inter-correlated features.
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Table 6: conditions to test for sensitivity to feature correlations
Condition

Example

Number
of Trials

1 Features all the
same

↑Long Waves, ↑ High Waves, ↑
Rotating Winds, ↑ Soil Moisture 40-100
cm below surface; ↓ Short Waves, ↓
Low Waves, ↓ Consistent Winds, ↓ Soil
Moisture 10 cm below surface

24

Same plus missing
feature

↑High Waves, ↑ Rotating Winds, ↑Soil
Moisture 40-100 cm below surface

2 Independent feature
is inconsistent

↑ Long Waves, ↑ High Waves,
↑Rotating Winds, ↓ Soil Moisture 10 cm
below surface; ↓ Short Waves, ↓ Low
Waves, ↓ Consistent Winds, ↑Soil
Moisture 40-100 cm below surface

Independent feature
inconsistent plus
correlated feature
missing

↑ High Waves, ↑Rotating Winds, ↓ Soil
Moisture 10 cm below surface; ↓ Low
Waves, ↓ Consistent Winds, ↑Soil
Moisture 40-100 cm below surface

3 1 inter correlated
feature is inconsistent

↓ Short Waves, ↑ High Waves, ↑
Rotating Winds, ↑ Soil Moisture 40-100
cm below surface

one correlated feature
inconsistent plus
independent variable
missing

24

18

↓ Short Waves, ↑ High Waves, ↑
Rotating Winds

4 1 independent and 1
correlated feature the
same but 1 correlated
feature inconsistent

↓ Short Waves, ↑ High Waves, ↑
Rotating Winds, ↓ Soil Moisture 10 cm
below surface

Independent and 1
correlated feature the
same but one
correlated feature
missing

↑ High Waves, ↓ Consistent Winds, ↑
Soil Moisture 40-100 cm below surface
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To the extent that participants responded differently to the independent feature
inconsistent condition and the inter-correlated feature inconsistent condition then they are
correctly incorporating the inter-correlated feature into their error detection decisions. In
order to help test hypothesis 1, the difference between responses to condition 2 and
condition 3 for each participant and the relation on performance when making probability
estimates during the practice trials was calculated, r = .1, p >.05. Results were
inconsistent with MMM hypothesis.
In condition 1 there is no error in the sensor report; all of the features are
consistent. In condition 2 there is also no error in the sensor report; only the independent
feature is inconsistent. Therefore, there should be no difference in error detection
responses between conditions 1 and 2. If there is a difference in responses it suggests
participants are incorrectly incorporating the irrelevant piece of information to make their
error detection decisions. In order to test whether participants were incorporating the
inconsistency of the independent feature into their error detection decision responses to
condition 1 and condition 2 were compared. A paired sample t-test showed a statistically
significant difference between condition 1 responses (M = .75, SD = .12) and condition 2
responses (M = .59, SD = .25) t(25)=3.28, p < .01.
In condition 3 there is an error in the sensor report; one of the inter-correlated
features is inconsistent with another inter-correlated feature(s). In condition 4 there is
also an error in the sensor report, however, in addition to one of the inter-correlated
features being inconsistent the independent feature is also inconsistent. If participants are
not inaccurately incorporating irrelevant information into their error detection decisions
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then there should be little to no difference between responses to condition 3 and condition
4. In order to test whether participants inaccurately incorporated the irrelevant piece of
information into their error detection decisions responses to condition 3 and condition 4
were compared. A paired sample t-test showed a statistically significant difference
between responses to condition 3 (M = .37, SD = .21) and condition 4 (M = .28, SD =
.16); t(25) = 3.5, p < .01. This suggests once again that participants are incorporating the
irrelevant piece of information and that their mental models of the “GFS” system does
not accurately represent the independence of the feature.
The relationship between performance during the practice trials and participants’
ability to detect an error in the sensor report was analyzed. There was a medium sized
correlation between the average for each participant during the practice trials and the
average for each participant for detecting an error in the sensor report, r = .4, p <.05.
Suggesting the knowledge of the system during the practice trials was related to the
knowledge used to detect an error in the sensor report.
To the extent that there is a difference in responses between conditions 1 and 2
then participants are inaccurately incorporating the independent feature into their error
detection decisions. A correlation was performed to determine if performance during the
practice trials while making probability estimates predicted participants’ likelihood to not
incorporate the irrelevant piece of information. Inconsistent with hypothesis 1,
participants performance when making probability estimates did not predict likelihood of
incorporating the irrelevant piece of information, r = -.1, p >.05.

MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION

45

Hypothesis 4 suggested that participants would be able to recognize their
strategies for detecting errors. Data from nineteen participants was gathered to assess
their strategies at detecting an error in the sensor report. Across the seven post-hoc
interview questions approximately half of the participants did not report using the intercorrelated nature of the features to detect an error in the sensor report (N = 10) (see
Appendix B for example responses). In contrast, participants reported using
inconsistencies between the feature weights and the GFS systems’ probability estimates.
In order to test hypothesis 4 (that strategies could be recognized) a correlation was
performed between the total score from each qualitative question and average sensor
error detection accuracy by participant. There was a statistically significant relation
between error detection accuracy and qualitative score r = .53, p < .05. This result may be
from an insufficient amount of qualitative data. It could be the case that participants’ used
two strategies to detect an error in the system report and only reported one. As will be
described in later results participants who made incorrect error detection judgments still
made corrections consistent with the inter-correlation. This may suggest that participants
used different knowledge to detect an error compared to correcting the error, or that they
may have used diverse strategies. However, the only strategies reported in the present
qualitative assessment was using either the comparison of the feature weights to the
probability estimates or using the feature inter-correlation. No participants reported using
both.
Further analyses were conducted to test for the sensitivity to feature correlation by
analyzing which features were chosen to correct the error(s) in the sensor report. In other
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words, which features participants chose to correct. A feature was reported incorrectly
when it reported incongruent information with another inter-correlated feature. For
example, when one inter-correlated feature was a positive indicator of a hurricane and
another inter-correlated feature was a negative indicator of a hurricane.
To help test hypothesis 2 and 3, two binomial tests were performed. The first
compared the proportion of correct changes consistent with the feature correlation when
there was no error in the sensor report and participants incorrectly detected an error. The
second, tested the comparison on trials where an error was present (i.e. feature(s) were
inconsistent). The first binomial test for the no error present trials, indicated that the
proportion of instances where participants made changes that were consistent with the
feature correlation of .58 was higher than the expected .5, p < .01. The second binomial
test for the error present trials, indicated that the proportion of instances where
participants made changes that were consistent with the feature correlation of .59 was
higher than the expected .5, p < .01. Results suggest that participants made changes
consistent with the feature correlation even when participants inaccurately indicated there
was an error in the sensor report. This result is consistent with hypothesis 2 and 3.
Once again hypothesis 1 was tested to determine if performance when making
probability estimates predicted performance at correcting errors in the sensor report. A
correlation was performed between the average accuracy of sensor error correction by
subject and performance during the practice trials r = -.12, p > .05. There was not a
statistically significant correlation between performance for sensor error correction and
performance during the practice trials.
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Half of the ninety-six error trials had an error in the shown probability estimate,
as produced by the “Global Forecasting System.” Participants accuracy in detecting the
error in the probability estimate ranged between 61% - 95% (M = .8, SD = .4). A Pearson
correlation was performed between the average accuracy by participant during the
practice trials and the average accuracy for detecting an error in the probability estimate
during the error detection trials, r = .4, p < .05. Results suggest that participants’
understanding (or mental model) of the simulated weather forecasting system, gained
during the practice trials, was associated with their ability to detect an error in the
probability estimates during the error detection trials.
The accuracy for participants correcting the probability estimate ranged
between 60% - 92% (M = .77, SD = .42). A Pearson correlation was also performed
between the average accuracy by participant during the practice trials and the average
accuracy for correcting the probability estimate during the error detection trials, r = .65, p
< .01. Results are consistent with the multi-function mental model hypothesis.
There was a statistically significant relationship between participants ability to
accurately detect an error in the probability estimate and their ability to correct the error
in the probability estimate, r = .59, p < .01. Suggesting that if participants are able to
accurately detect the error they will also be likely to correct the error. However, even
when some participants some of the time inaccurately detect an error they still may be
able to correct it.
Results from Experiment 4a supported the MMM hypothesis. Many of the error
detection and correction decisions and judgements had a statistically significant relation
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with participants’ performance when making probability estimates. Results also
supported the second hypothesis; error detection decisions were consistent with
understanding the relational structure of the inter-correlated features. Results also
supported the third hypothesis; error correction decisions were consistent with the intercorrelated nature of the features. Finally, results also supported the fourth hypothesis;
reported strategies had a statistically significant relation to accurate error detection
decisions in the sensor report. Experiment 4b was designed to replicate results from
Experiment 4a. Experiment 4b differed in two ways. (1) The first was the way the hidden
statistical model weighed the inter-correlated features. (2) Because a number of
participants’ reported using the inconsistencies between feature weights and the GFS
systems reported probability estimates as their strategy for detecting an error in the sensor
report the reported probability estimate was not shown on the same screen when
participants were asked sensor error detection questions.
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Chapter 7: Experiment 4b
Experiment 4b was designed to replicate results from Experiment 4a. There were
two differences between Experiment 4a and 4b. The first was in how the hidden
statistical model weighed the inter-correlated features. In Experiment 4a the weights of
the first three features were added together to make the probability estimate. In
Experiment 4b the value that appeared most often of the three inter-correlated feature was
weighted and incorporated into the probability estimate. For example, if two of the three
features were negative indicators (-1,-1) and the third was a positive indicator (1) the
mode of the three features was incorporated into the model (-1). Weighing the intercorrelated features in this way is more consistent with how probability estimates work
with inter-correlated features in more naturalistic environments. The second way
Experiment 4b differed was in how participants’ were presented with the error detection
question in the sensor report. In Experiment 4a participants’ were shown the probability
estimate and the sensor error detection question on the same screen. Qualitative analyses
suggested a number of participants’ used inconsistencies between feature weights and the
GFS systems reported probability estimates as their strategy for detecting an error in the
sensor report. Therefore, error detection questions were not displayed on the same screen.
Participants would first respond to the sensor report error detection question and only
after responding were they shown the probability estimate.
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Methods
Participants. Twenty-six participants were collected from the Michigan
Technological University student subject pool. Demographics are reported in Table 4.
Materials and Procedure. Materials and procedure were the same as those
reported in Experiment 4a.
Results and Discussion
For the practice trials, no participants scored at or lower than chance. Accuracy
ranged between 22% - 67% (M = .43, SD = .49).
Accuracy for detecting an error in the sensor report ranged between 52% - 94%
(M = .71, SD = .45). In order to test for sensitivity to feature correlations a general
linear model was performed to compare the effect of (IV’s) condition type on (DV)
sensor error detection accuracy (See Table 6 for the different condition types). A chisquare analysis of deviance was performed on the model to test if the conditions
explained variability in sensor error detection response more than chance χ2 = 60.60, df =
4, p < .01. Results suggest that condition type (as identified by Table 6) does influence
sensor error detection responses. Therefore, further analyses were conducted to test for
sensitivity to the inter-correlated nature of the features when making error detection
decisions. A paired samples t-test was conducted to test whether there was a statistically
significant difference in error detection responses between independent feature
inconsistent and inter-correlated feature inconsistent conditions. Results were similar to
Experiment 4a, there was a significant difference in responses between when the
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independent feature was inconsistent (M = .62, SD = .34) and when the inter-correlated
feature was inconsistent (M = .34, SD = .33); t(24) = 2.94, p < .01. Consistent with
Hypothesis 2, this result suggests that participants were sensitive to and understood the
relational structure of the inter-correlated features.
To the extent that participants responded differently to the independent feature
inconsistent (condition 2) and the inter-correlated feature inconsistent (condition 3) then
they are correctly incorporating the inter-correlated feature into their error detection
decisions. In order to help test hypothesis 1, the difference between responses to
condition 2 and condition 3 for each participant and the relation on performance when
making probability estimates during the practice trials was calculated, r = .44, p <.05.
Results were inconsistent with hypothesis 1.
In condition 1 there is no error in the sensor report; all of the features are
consistent. In condition 2 there is also no error in the sensor report; only the independent
feature is inconsistent. Therefore, there should be no difference in error detection
responses between conditions 1 and 2. If there is a difference in responses it suggests
participants are incorrectly incorporating the irrelevant piece of information to make their
error detection decisions. In order to test whether participants were incorporating the
inconsistency of the independent feature into their error detection decision responses to
condition 1 and condition 2 were compared. A paired sample t-test showed a statistically
significant difference between condition 1 responses (M = .92, SD = .11) and condition 2
responses (M = .62, SD = .34) t(24)=4.43, p < .01.
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In condition 3 there is an error in the sensor report; one of the inter-correlated

features is inconsistent with another inter-correlated feature(s). In condition 4 there is
also an error in the sensor report, however, in addition to one of the inter-correlated
features being inconsistent the independent feature is also inconsistent. If participants are
not inaccurately incorporating irrelevant information into their error detection decisions
then there should be little to no difference between responses to condition 3 and condition
4. In order to test whether participants inaccurately incorporated the irrelevant piece of
information into their error detection decisions responses to condition 3 and condition 4
were compared. A paired sample t-test showed a statistically significant difference
between responses to condition 3 (M = .35, SD = .33) and condition 4 (M = .37, SD =
.30); t(24) = -0.59, p > .01. This suggests that the independent feature does not influence
error detection responses when an error is present.
To the extent that there is a difference in responses between conditions 1 and 2
then participants are inaccurately incorporating the independent feature into their error
detection decisions. A correlation was performed to determine if performance during the
practice trials while making probability estimates predicted participants’ likelihood to not
incorporate the irrelevant piece of information. Inconsistent with hypothesis 1,
participants performance when making probability estimates did not predict likelihood of
incorporating the irrelevant piece of information, r = -.22, p >.05.
The relationship between performance during the practice trials and participants’
ability to detect an error in the sensor report was analyzed. There was a medium sized
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correlation between the average for each participant during the practice trials and the
average for each participant for detecting an error in the sensor report, r = .49, p <.05.
Results suggest participants are sensitive to the inter-correlated nature of the
features. In order to help test hypothesis 4 which suggests participants are able to
recognize their strategies for detecting errors qualitative data was analyzed. Seven posthoc interview questions were asked (see appendix A for post-hoc questions). All of the
participants interviewed (N = 11) provided responses consistent with understanding the
inter-correlation between the features. Since all participants reported using the intercorrelated nature of the features to make their error detection responses the relation
between strategies used to detect an error in the sensor report and performance when
making probability estimates during the practice trials could not be analyzed. However,
overall performance at detecting error in the sensor report is higher for experiment 4a
compared to 4b which is consistent with the results reflected in the qualitative
assessment. In contrast to Experiment 4a, more participants also reported using only the
inconsistency between the first three inter-correlated features, which is consistent with
the hidden statistical model. In Experiment 4a many participants reported using a
majority rules strategy, regardless of whether the feature was independent or not.
However, across both experiments participants reported using the independent feature as
a tie breaker for choosing which inter-correlated feature was reported incorrectly.
Further analyses were conducted to test for the sensitivity to feature correlation by
analyzing which features were chosen to correct the error(s) in the sensor report. In other
words which features participants chose to correct. Two binomial tests were performed,
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one for comparing the proportion of correct changes consistent with the feature
correlation when there was no error in the sensor report and participants incorrectly
detected an error and the second one for testing the comparison of the same proportion
but on trials where an error was present (i.e. feature(s) were inconsistent). The first
binomial test for the no error present trials, indicated that the proportion of instances
where participants made changes that were consistent with the feature correlation of .81
was higher than the expected .5, p < .01. The second binomial test for the error present
trials, indicated that the proportion of instances where participants made changes that
were consistent with the feature correlation of .83 was higher than the expected .5, p <
.01. Results suggest that participants made changes consistent with the feature correlation
even when participants inaccurately indicated there was an error in the sensor report
when there was none.
A correlation was performed between the average accuracy of sensor error
correction by subject and performance during the practice trials r =.26, p > .05. There
was not a statistically significant correlation between performance for sensor error
correction and performance during the practice trials.
Participants accuracy in detecting the error in the probability estimate ranged
between 44% - 99% (M = .71, SD = .45). A Pearson correlation was performed between
the average accuracy by participant during the practice trials and the average accuracy for
detecting an error in the probability estimate during the error detection trials, r = .67, p <
.01. Results suggest that participants’ understanding of the system, gained during the
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practice trials, was associated with their ability to detect an error in probability estimates
during the error detection trials.
The accuracy for participants correcting the probability estimate ranged between
54% - 92% (M = .75, SD = .43). A Pearson correlation was performed between the
average accuracy by participant during the practice trials and the average accuracy for
correcting the probability estimate during the error detection trials, r = .3, p > .05. Results
are not consistent with the multifunction mental model hypothesis.
There was a statistically significant relationship between participants ability to
accurately detect an error in the probability estimate and their ability to correct the error
in the probability estimate, r = .73, p < .01.
Based on quantitative results from novices alone it is unclear how specialized
knowledge would influence performance on many of these sensemaking operations.
Therefore, an attempt was made to collect data from experts in weather forecasting. Only
one participant was recruited. The participant was a coursework completed PhD student
in atmospheric sciences. In addition to asking this participant to run asking this
participant the seven post-hoc interview questions and asking them to explain their
thought processes while detecting error in the sensor report they were also asked specific
questions about their knowledge of weather forecasting and how it related to the tasks.
The participant indicated that their specialized knowledge did not influence how they
responded to the task. The participant was also asked about the ecological validity of the
features to how weather operated in the real world. They reported that at least some of the
features and their weights was consistent with what they knew about how weather

56

MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION

operated, particularly, for the area where the task was held. Cloud cover would be a poor
indicator because in the area where the task was given it is frequently cloudy, therefore,
not a good indicator of a storm.
Results in Experiment 4b closely follow results found in Experiment 4a. Table 9,
shows the analyses for testing for the multifunction mental model hypothesis across all
experiment. Evidence was found across many of the sensemaking operations. However,
not all analyses supported the MMM hypothesis. For example, average accuracy in
probability estimates and correcting probability estimates in Experiment 4b. Explanations
for the mixed results will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 8: General Discussion
The present research investigated combining methods from both micro- and
macrocognitive paradigms in order to create unique advantages. The primary process
under investigation, sensemaking, and its supporting function mental models, are not
traditionally evaluated using empirical methods. One of the goals of this research was to
take another step closer to complimenting existing methods used to study mental models,
such as Cognitive Task Analysis (Klein & Hoffman, 2008). In this thesis quantitative and
qualitative data was used to infer how people think about the system they were operating.
The structure of participants’ mental models was inferred based on their performance
while operating the simulated weather forecasting system and responses to qualitative
assessment.
There were four hypotheses of the present research. (1) MMM hypothesis;
performance of one sensemaking operation is predictive of performance of other related
sensemaking operations. (2) Through brief instruction and feedback, mental models are
developed that involve understanding the relational structure between inter-correlated and
independent feature(s). (3) Understanding of the relational structure of the features can be
used to make error correction decisions. (4) The strategies that utilize the inter-correlated
nature of the features can be recognized and verbalized by users.
Experiment 1 suggested through brief instruction, visual feedback, and audio
feedback that participants created a mental model of the system which related all eight
differentially weighted features to the probability estimates. This evidence was consistent
with hypothesis 2. Some evidence was also gathered for the MMM hypothesis;
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evacuation decisions were closely related to probability estimates. This suggests that
initial learning through feedback from making probability estimates was also used to
make evacuation decisions. Experiment 2 was designed to extend testing for other vital
sensemaking operations. Consistent with the MMM hypothesis Experiment 2 suggested
that participants’ mental model of the simulated system while making probability
estimates was strongly associated with participants’ ability to make correct blame
attributions. Results from Experiment 3 largely replicated results from Experiment 2.
Experiments 4a-4b were extensions of Experiments 1-3. There were two
differences between Experiments 4a and 4b. (1) How the hidden statistical model created
the “true” probability estimates. (2) In Experiment 4b the probability estimate was
removed from the screen when the error detection in the sensor report questions were
asked. Experiments 4a and 4b were designed to test whether participants can make
probability estimates, detect, diagnose, and correct errors by using inter-correlated
features. Making accurate error detection, diagnosis, and correction determinations
requires a different mental strategy and computation compared to independent features
alone, as illustrated in the example in Chapter 1. Participants’ accuracy in making their
weather predictions (in the form of probability estimates) was used as an empirical
measure of the quality of participants’ mental models of the simulated weather
forecasting system in addition to responses from the qualitative assessment.
Results from both Experiments 4a & 4b supported the second hypothesis;
performance when making error detection decisions was consistent with understanding
the relational structure between the inter-correlated and independent features. However,

MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION

59

surprisingly results also suggested participants incorrectly incorporated the independent
and irrelevant piece of information when making their error detection decisions. Results
from both Experiments also supported hypothesis 3, error correction decisions were made
by incorporating the relational structure of the inter-correlated features. Assessment of
qualitative data suggested that as a result of manipulations between Experiment 4a and 4b
participants were more likely to learn the accurate relations between features (i.e. have a
more accurate mental model of the simulated system) in Experiment 4b compared to 4a.
However, results from Experiment 4a was still consistent with the fourth hypothesis;
there was a statistically significant relation between verbalized strategies and
performance when making error detection decisions. While results from both
Experiments supported hypotheses 2-4 the results for the first hypothesis is somewhat
mixed.
Across experiments results generally supported the MMM hypothesis;
performance on one task was predictive of performance on other related tasks (see Table
9). However, this was not consistent for each related task. Each of these relations will be
briefly reviewed. Do to the nature of how the hidden statistical model produced the “true”
probability estimate in Experiment 4a, participants did not need to understand the intercorrelated nature of the features to make accurate probability estimates. Therefore, a
participant could be fairly accurate while making probability estimates and be entirely
unaware of the inter-correlated nature of the features. This likely explains the lack of a
statistically significant relation between performance when making probability estimates
and sensitivity to the inter-correlated nature of the features when making error detection
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decisions for Experiment 4a. This result is also consistent with operating an intelligent
tool in more naturalistic settings. Operators could have aspects of their mental model of
the intelligent tool that are entirely inaccurate and still be able to operate the tool for
certain sensemaking operations. The second relation that did not support the MMM
hypothesis was between performance when making probability estimates and
performance when making sensor error corrections. The lack of a statistically significant
relation could suggest that some functions transfer during initial learning of the task
while others do not. Performance when making sensor error corrections could require
further knowledge or a better mental model of the system not achieved through feedback
while making probability estimates. Future studies could test if initial learning while
making error corrections transfers to making probability estimates. Other possible
explanation could be some participants misunderstood the task. However, the average at
making accurate error corrections was higher than chance. Finally, the lack of a
statistically significant relation between performance when making probability estimates
and correcting probability estimates in Experiment 4b could be from an outlier,
insufficient sample size, randomness, or once again suggest that the knowledge required
to make the probability estimates is unique from the knowledge required to correct the
probability estimates. Future studies should be done to help test for the relations analyzed
in this thesis.
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Table 9: Results across experiments testing for evidence for the MMM hypothesis.
Function

Exp1

Exp2

Exp3

Exp4a

Exp4b

Probability Estimates and
Evacuation Decisions

r = .81**

Probability Estimates and
blame attributions

r = .9**

r = .92**

Probability Estimates and using
sensor feature weights to
correct probability estimates

r = -.68**

r = -.34

Probability Estimates and
sensitivity to inter-correlation

r = .1

r = .44*

Probability Estimates and
sensor error detection

r = .4*

r = .49*

Probability Estimates and
sensor error correction

r =-.12

r =.26

Probability Estimates and error
detection in probability
estimates

r = .4*

r = .67**

Probability Estimates and error
correction in probability
estimates

r = .65**

r = .3

Qualitative data on sensitivity
to feature correlation and
sensor error detection accuracy

r = .53*

NA

**p < .01;* p < .05.
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Since the 1970’s there has been a concern about all the different microcognitive

processes fitting together (Newell, 1973). Specifically, by becoming increasingly narrow
in investigation, there is concern that there will be little transfer or generalizability
(Gozli, 2017). Unfortunately, not much has changed (Hommel & Colzato, 2015).
Experimental researchers often only study microcognition outside of the larger process
that they are supporting (Hommel & Colzato, 2015). However, the present research
provides some evidence that suggests a larger cognitive system can be analyzed within
the lab; combing advantages of empirical analysis, systematic analysis, and qualitative
assessment.
Error detection, diagnosis, and correction are a part of good decision making
within human-machine systems. Mental models are necessary for system error detection,
diagnosis, correction, and many other vital functions. To the extent that we have a better
understanding of how people form and use mental models, we can more adequately
enable people to perform more efficiently and effectively in changing and unexpected
environments. Across experiments results generally supported the MMM hypothesis. If
the MMM hypothesis is true then there may be implications for training and learning
transfer. Performance for one cognitive operation while operating an intelligent tool was
predictive of many other cognitive processes when operating the same intelligent tool.
This is consistent with research being conducted on Experiential User Guides (EUG);
which suggests that training in some sensemaking operations (such as error detection and
diagnosis) helps refine operators mental models and therefore improve performance for
other sensemaking operations while operating the same intelligent tool (Mueller & Klein,
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2011). Consistent with this research the present results indicate there is a certain subset of
organized knowledge (or mental model) of the intelligent tool users are interacting with
that can be built and refined and adapted to different related tasks when interacting with
an intelligent tool. Therefore, training in multiple sensemaking operations may be useful
for refining the mental model of the intelligent tool and that refinement will likely
increase performance of other tasks when operating the intelligent tool.
This research also expands upon previous research conducted using intercorrelated features. Previous research has suggested people do incorporate negatively
correlated features in their decision making as measured by an increase in deliberation
time (Fasolo et al., 2007). However, learning and the use of inter-correlated features for
accomplishing complex goals has been relatively unexplored. This use of inter-correlated
features impacts all of the sensemaking operations. Results from Experiments 4a-4b
suggest that participants can learn associations between weighted inter-correlated features
and therefore incorporate this understanding into their mental models of the intelligent
tool they are operating.
In addition to learning the inter-correlated nature of the features, results also
suggested that participants use some irrelevant information to make error detection and
correction decisions, despite never being provided with feedback or instruction to do so.
This could be the result of the initial mental model and frame participants come into the
lab with before they even start the task. The mental model within the data/frame theory
contains background knowledge which is valuable for explaining how the system
operates. It could be the case that participants already have a frame and mental model that
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related all of the features together and not enough feedback was provided that challenged
their frame and mental model to be refined (Klein et al., 2006b). Many laboratory studies
do not consider learning and prediction by using inter-correlated vs. independent features
(e.g. Gluck et al. (2002)). Future microcognitive studies may need to control for
interpretation of features being inter-correlated. Future research should could also test
whether it is generally adaptive to have an initial frame or mental model that contains a
structure of inter-correlated features.
Across experiments there was variability in participants’ performance when
making probability estimates and no participant was completely accurate. In verbal
reports some participants described having different baselines for creating there
probability estimates. Some participants started at zero before incorporating information
from the sensor report, some started at .5, while others started at .75. This is consistent
with previous research on the use of improper linear models; people generally perform
poorly when making predictions from integrating information (Dawes, 1979). Therefore,
results help support the notion of using proper linear models.
Limitations
There are some notable limitations to the present research. First, the sample was
taken from an undergraduate college population. It is unclear whether results will
generalize to other populations. It is also unclear how results would generalize to other
more naturalistic settings. Future research should validate these finding in more
naturalistic settings with experts. Experts may be better equipped to ignore the irrelevant
piece of information when making error detection and correction decisions.
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Conclusion
Sensemaking is a vital process for a number of diverse operations, but little
research has been conducted on sensemaking within the lab. This thesis describes
research on studying a macrocognition process within a microcognition world. By
combing methods from both micro- and macrocognitive paradigms future research will
provide useful insight into how to create trainings and interventions to make
sociotechnical systems more efficient and enduring. Based on data across four
experiments results generally supported the MMM hypothesis. This has implications for
training; training in multiple sensemaking operations may be useful for refining the
mental model of the intelligent tool and that refinement will likely increase performance
of other tasks when operating the intelligent tool.
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Appendix A – Post-hoc Interview Questions
Participants were instructed to consider the task of detecting an error in the sensor report
and shown an example.
1. What information did you have available to you when making these decisions?
2. What did you look for when you made this decision?
3. How did you know that what you were paying attention to was the correct
information?
4. Did you do anything to confirm what you were paying attention to was correct?
5. Have you had any previous experience with this kind of task that helped you determine
the correct response?
6. What specific parts of the training or experience was helpful when making these
decisions?
7. What short cuts or strategies did you use when solving these problems?
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Appendix B – Interview Response Examples
When asked “what did you look for when you made this decision” participant 9
responded “I was just trying to see if it correlated with the graph (therm) on the side.
Also, if they didn’t go together if high waves and soil being under 40.”
When asked about thought process on specific examples participant 9 responded “I was
using both report and therm (probability estimate) I would say the chance would be a
little bit higher. Using therm to determine if there was an error in the report because I
didn’t understand when just looking at the report. I would say therm should be lower just
because the soil being below 40 and waves being longer.”
When asked “what short cuts or strategies did you use when solving these problems”
participant 11 responded “my strategy was to look at how many arrows there were to low
compare to the temp and see if I thought they lined up.”
When asked about thought process on specific examples participant 11 responded “This
one I’m looking at how many low arrows there are to high and I’m looking at the bar has
changed. I feel like in this one since there are more low arrows, then high, the prediction
is wrong. There’s something wrong in the features because of what’s shown on the
temp.”
When asked “What factors need to be considered before fixing the error participant 19
responded “whether or not all three of these were the same and then figure out if which
one was incorrect then you look at the soil moisture to help fix the problem.”
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When asked about thought process on specific examples participant 19 responded “the
soil moisture is there and the wave’s length and winds are the same direction. No error.”

